Litigation Privilege - Production of Lawyer's Notes of Interview

A recent case deals with production of statements taken by an opposing party.  It provides a summary of the principles relating to litigation privilege.

In Hart v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 ONSC 6067 (S.C.J.), the plaintiff brought a motion seeking production of notes that had been made by counsel for the defendant several years earlier when the plaintiff was a potential witness in another lawsuit arising out of the same factual nexus.  The notes appeared to be an almost verbatim translation of the interview.  The defendant argued the notes were protected by litigation privilege.  The Master ordered the notes to be produced and the defendant appealed.

The appeal was dismissed.  Litigation privilege cannot restrict disclosure of an opposing party's statements.  Information or statements that are obtained from an opposing party cannot be confidential from that party.  To the extent a document is a mere recording of information given by the opposing party, it is not subject to litigation privilege, even though it was created with a view to anticipated future actions; however, if the document contains something more that amounts to a solicitor's work product, then it is privileged.  Counsel for the defendant would be permitted to make a proposal to redact certain parts of the document that contained information that was more than simply a record of the plaintiff's interview and statement, such as margin notes, underlining and highlighting.

It appears that the key fact was that the notes contained an almost verbatim recording of the plaintiff's interview.  If the notes contained the solicitor's strategies or theories, the outcome may have been different.

Definition of "Accident" Under the SABS

How far can the definition of "accident" under the SABS be stretched?

In Dominion of Canada v. Prest, 2013 ONSC 92 (S.C.J.), the insured was washing his car and tripped over a curb sticking out from the wall of his parking garage.  He claimed that his right hand was touching the car as he fell, and therefore he was entitled to accident benefits.  Dominion sought a determination as to whether the incident met the definition of an "accident" within s. 3(1) of the SABS, which defines "accident" as "an incident in which the use or operation of an automobile directly causes an impairment."

Justice McNamara held that the incident was not an "accident".  He used the two part test set out by the Court of Appeal in Chisholm v. Liberty Mutual (2002), O.R. (3d) 776 (C.A.) and Greenhalgh v. ING (2004), CanLii 21045 (C.A.):

(a)  Did the incident arise out of the use or operation of an automobile (the “purpose test”); and

(b)  Did such use or operation of an automobile directly cause the impairment (the “causation test”).

Justice McNamara held that the vehicle was not being used or operated at the time of the incident and was not a direct cause of the impairment.  The use of the car had ended without injury being suffered and tripping over the curb was a new intervening act. The insured was not entitled to accident benefits, showing that there is indeed a limit to how far the definition can be stretched.

Loss Transfer - Cost of Assessments

Early this year, we blogged on a decision by Justice Greer holding that the costs of insurer generated assessments under s. 42 of the SABS are not recoverable under the loss transfer provisions (Wawanesa v. Axa).  The matter was appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal decision is found at 2012 ONCA 592.  The Court dismissed the appeal.  Section 275(1) of the Insurance Act provides:

The insurer responsible under subsection 268(2) for the payment of statutory accident benefits to such classes of persons as may be named in the regulations is entitled, subject to such terms, conditions, provisions, exclusions and limits as may be prescribed, to indemnification in relation to such benefits paid by it from the insurers of such class or classes of automobiles as may be named in the regulations involved in the incident from which responsibility to pay the statutory accident benefits arose.

Justice Weiler held that the words "in relation to" convey a connection between two related subject matters.  A "connection" must be between statutory benefits paid and the cost of the assessment, and only exists if the ABs were actually paid.  If the assessment only saved some benefits from being paid unnecessarily there would be full indemnification, but no indemnification if no benefits were paid.  The legislature could not have intended such an anomalous result. In addition, the connection should be between insurer generated assessments and ABs paid to the insured, whereas the cost of the assessment is paid to the doctor who conducts the assessment.

Justice Blair wrote a dissenting opinion, preferring a wide scope to the words "in relation to" that would include the cost of assessments.

Giving the dissenting opinion, perhaps this matter will be headed to the Supreme Court for final clarification, especially given the rising costs of assessments.

Happy Holidays

Happy holidays from the Ontario Insurance Law Blog.  We'll be back in January with our weekly posts.  We wish you all the best in 2013.

When Has FSCO Mediation Failed - Part 2

Last week, we blogged on the Court of Appeal`s decision in Hurst v. Aviva, which held that insureds may proceed to bring court actions or arbitration proceedings if 60 days have passed since an application for mediation at FSCO has been filed and no mediation has taken place.

The Court released its decision in Younis v. State Farm Insurance Company, 2012 ONCA 836 (C.A.) concurrently with Hurst.  In the Hurst actions, the 60 day period had elapsed prior to the insured filing a court action.  In Younis, however, the claimant applied for mediation on July 14, 2011 and filed a court action a few days later. State Farm`s motion to stay the action took place well after the 60 day period had elapsed.  Justice Sloan refused to stay the action. 

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal.  The Court held that the insured commenced his action in contravention of the statutory requirement by not waiting 60 days.  Since Younis had not waited until mediation had failed, his action was barred.  To allow otherwise would permit insured person to immediately commence civil actions and the statute did not permit this tactic.

When Has FSCO Mediation Failed - Part 1

We previously blogged on the decision in Cornie v. State Farm, in which Justice Sloan held that insureds may commence claims against their accident benefits carriers if 60 days have elapsed since an application for mediation has been filed, even if mediation itself has not occurred.  The Court of Appeal has now released its appeal decision in Hurst v. Aviva, 2012 ONCA 837 (C.A.).

Section 281(2) of the Insurance Act prevents insured persons from commencing court actions or arbitrations against their insurers unless they first seek mediation and mediation has failed.  The claimants waited 60 days after applying for mediation and when no mediation had taken place, they commenced actions.  FSCO`s position was that the prescribed 60 day time limit for conducting mediation did not begin to run until an application for mediation had been assessed by FSCO and found to be complete.  FSCO refused to issue a report declaring the mediations had failed.  The insurers in four actions brought motions to have the actions stayed on the basis that they were barred by s. 281(2) as mediation had not taken place.  Justice Sloan dismissed the motions and the insurers appealed. 

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals.  The Court concluded that the process is intended to be completed with 60 days after an application for mediation has been filed; however, if mediation has not taken place within 60 days, insured persons are free to pursue either court action or arbitration. 

The Court rejected the insurers` arguments that the cost to the industry could be $83 million as a result of the interpretation of the Act that does not require mediation to actually take place.  The insurers submitted statistics that 75% of claims are resolved by mediation at FSCO.  One has to expect a flood of court proceedings as a result of this decision, along with significant costs to insurers.

Appellate Jurisdiction

Under the Courts of Justice Act, appeals relating to amounts greater than $50,000 must be made to the Court of Appeal.  Appeals of judgments relating to amounts under $50,000 are to the Divisional Court.  Where only a portion of a judgment is appealed, does the jurisdiction change?

In Grammatico v. Chambers, 2012 ONSC 6518 (Div. Ct.), the parties disagreed on whether the proper court to hear an appeal was the Divisional Court or the Court of Appeal.  The substantive judgment involved sums greater than $50,000, the threshold imposed by s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act for appeals to the Court of Appeal. The defendant argued that it sought to appeal an interest component relating to costs, rather than the substantive judgment.  Since the amount would be less than $50,000 the defendant's position was that the appeal was to the Divisional Court.

Justice Eberhard held that the appeal was to the Court of Appeal.  The jurisdiction for appeal must be determined by the aggregate of the sums awarded.  The fact that only one part of the decision was under appeal did not determine jurisdiction.